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RECENT CASE NOTES
hibit him from effecting a complete possession or from maintaining
his possession, would be equivalent to rendering nugatory his right of peace-
ful re-possession. Although the Indiana Courts have apparently not de-
cided the point, the great weight of authority is that regardless of the fact
that the landlord made a peaceable re-entry, he is liable in damages if, by
his negligence, the tenant's chattels are damaged, or if by the use of exces-
sive force the tenant or the members of his family are injured. See collec-
tion of cases in 45 A. L. R. 326; 36 C. J. 601; 16 R. C. L. 1180.
R. 0. E.
REAL PRoPERTY-FuTURE INTERESTS-RIGHTS OF UNBORN CHIn--On
January 23, 1869, Henry Pierce, owner of certain land, conveyed by a quit
claim deed (his wife joining therein) the land to his wife, Telitha Pierce, for
life, then to his daughter, Adeline Pierce, during her life, and then to her
children. At the time of the conveyance Adeline Pierce was unmarried and
without children, but she subsequently married with one Alvah Evans
and had born to her a son, George A. Evans. After a divorce Adeline
Evans was remarried to Frank G. Bearss and shortly afterwards brought
suit to quiet title to the land alleging a fee simple in herself. All living
parties having an interest in the land were made defendants in the action
including the infant son, George Evans, who upon defaulting was repre-
sented by a guardian ad litemr The circuit court decreed a fee simple title
in Adeline Bearss (n~e Pierce) and that same be forever quieted in her.
On May 9, 1892, some eleven years after the rendition of that decree,
Eva Bearss, the present appellant, was born to Adeline and Frank G.
Bearss. Eva Bearss brought an action alleging ownership in fee simple
of an undivided one-half interest in remainder, subject to her mother's
life estate and asked that title thereto be quieted in her. A demurrer to
the complaint was sustained and an appeal taken to the Supreme Court of
Indiana. Held, in accordance with the law as it existed at time of the
original conveyance and suit to quiet title a fee simple title vested in the
daughter and hence there could be no remainder over to any child of Ade-
line, then in existence or thereafter born. Bearss v. Corbett, Supreme Court
of Indiana, 177 N. E. 59.
The Supreme Court holding is summarized in the following quotation
from the opinion:
"Under the law as it exists in Indiana at the present time a grant to
A during her life, then to B during her life and then to her children gives
B (upon the death of A) a life estate, with a remainder over to her chil-
dren after her death."
An investigation into the cited authority establishes beyond reasonable
doubt the truth and validity of that statement. Hackleman v. Hacklemran
(1925) 88 Ind. App. 204; Alsran v. Walters (1914) 184 Ind. 565; Burrell
v. Jean (1925) 196 Ind. 187; Coquillard v. Coquillard (1916) 62 Ind. App.
489. The rule deduced from a consideration of these and other authorities
is that if a testator or grantor, by unambiguous language, creates a con-
tingent remainder, it is the duty of the courts to uphold it. It is clear that
in the instant case there is no ambiguity as the grant simply states "to my
daughter, Adeline Pierce, during her life and then to her children." The
only possible construction afforded by that language seems to be that B
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took a life estate with a contingent remainder to her children. Tiffany
(2 Ed.), Sec. 136 at 484.
Continuing in his summarizing the Chief Justice says: "But (strange
as it may seem to us now), under the law at the time the quiet title suit
of Adeline Bearss was decided and up until the case of McIlhinny v. Mc-
Ilhinny (1894), 137 Ind. 411, overruled the case of Fletcher v. Fletcher
(1882), 88 Ind. 418, such a grant gave B (i. e. Adeline Bearss) upon the
death of A (i. e. Telitha Pierce) and upon the birth of children to B, a title
in fee simple."
The case of Fletcher v. Fletcher, supra, considered the following convey-
ance: X to A and B during their lives and then to their children respect-
ively in fee simple. In the decision of that case the court decreed that by
the original grant A and B were given a conditional fee which ripened into
a fee simple upon the birth of children. Only three cases are cited in that
opinion as supporting such an interpretation. Two of these may be dis-
posed of briefly by showing that they decided no issue pertinent to the case
under consideration. Glass v. Glass, 71 Ind. 392, concerning a present grant
to A and his children. There was no question as to the remainder and the
opinion concerns only the grant of a present estate to a person not in ex-
istence. Biggs v. McCarter, 86 Ind. 352, also was concerned with a present
.grant to a person not in esse and is not concerned with a remainder after
a particular estate. It is to be assumed therefore that the Fletcher case is
based upon the only other cited authority, King v. Rea, 56 Ind. 1.
In the case of King v. Rea, supra, there was a conveyance to A for life,
remainder to the issue of her body in fee. The court construed issue in its
technical sense and after noting that such a conveyance would create a fee
tail which in turn would be adjudged a fee simple under our statute (See.
13412, Burns Ann. Ind. Stat. 1926), decreed that the words "issue of her
body" were words of limitation and not of 'purchase so that A took a fee
simple estate by operation of the rule in Shelley's Case, 1 Coke. 88 and
The Indiana Statute (now see. 13412 Burns Ann. Ind. Stat. 1926). As sup-
porting their interpretation the court refers to the following cases: Gan-
zales v. Barton, 45 Ind. 295; Small v. Howland, 14 Ind. 592; Hall v. Beals,
23 Ind. 25; Siceloff v. Redman, 26 Ind. 251; Tipton v. LaRose, 27 Ind. 484;
and Andrews v. Spurlin, 35 Ind. 262. In each of these cases either the
words "heirs of the body," "lawful issue," or "lawful heirs" are used in the
conveyance and in none of the decisions has the word "children" been con-
strued to mean "issue."
It appears therefore that the case of Fletcher v. Fletcher, supra, stands
alone in the position that a life estate with a remainder to children may be
construed as a remainder to "issue" or "heirs of the body" and thereby per-
mit the application of the Rule in Shelley's case.
The case of Mcllhinny v. McIlhinny, supra, which the court relied upon
as changing the law as respects conveyances of the kind under discussion
goes further than merely disregarding the interpretation in Fletcher v.
Fletcher. In that case there was a conveyance to A for life and then to
her issue born alive with remainder over in case A die without issue born
alive.
The court refused to give to the word "issue" its technical meaning and
construed it as meaning children. Under such a conveyance A took a life
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estate with a contingent remainder created in favor of her children born
alive. This decision does not stand alone insofar as it substitutes the word
"children" for "issues" but the contrary interpretation is rarely made and
only then in cases construing wills wherein the context of the instrument as
a whole shows clearly the intent of the testator to be that such meaning was
intended. L. R. A. 1917B, 49-74.
The early Indiana cases always held the word "children" as used in a
deed, to be a word of purchase and not of limitation. Sorden v. Gatewood,
1 Ind. 107; Doe v. Jackman, 5 Ind. 283. This result was reached not only
by an application of natural meaning and import but was based on the
English Common Law precedents. Am. and Eng. Encyc. of Law, 229-233,
and authorities there cited.
It is apparent from these cases that the Indiana law has always been
that a grant to A for life remainder to her children creates a life estate
in A with a contingent remainder in her unborn children. The case of
Fletcher v. Fletcher, supra, since it rests on neither authority nor sound
interpretation must be considered both inconsistent and erroneous. In
truth the language, of that decision is indefensible. The court there said
that a deed to A for life with remainder to his children operated to give
A a "conditional fee." But a "conditional fee" has been unknown to the
Common Law since 1285 (1 Tiffany, Real Property, 2nd Ed., See. 23); it
being changed by the Statute De Donis into a fee tail. The court thus con-
strued the word "children" in a deed as meaning "heirs of the body" or
"issues," and called the result a "conditional fee" instead of a fee tail.
The grant with which we are concerned in the particular case should be
treated as giving Adeline Pierce Bearss a life estate with a contingent re-
mainder to her children such remainder becoming vested upon the birth of
George A. Evans. The gift vested in him subject to being partially divested
by opening up to let in after-born children, a category which included the
present appellant.
The case may be supported, however, upon different grounds. In the
Appellate Court hearing of the same case the Circuit Court's decree was
affirmed for the reason that the appellant, having a contingent interest un-
der the deed, was bound by an adverse decree rendered before she was born
against the guardian of an infant brother having similar interest, and so
virtually representing her, notwithstanding the fact that the decree was
erroneous. Bearss v. Corbett, 158 N. E. 299.
This decision amounts to an application of the doctrine of res judicata.
That doctrine is briefly this. When there is a complete and final adjudica-
tion of a cause of action the judgment in the case will act as a bar to a
subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies upon the same
issues. There can be no question that the issues in the present suit are
identical to those raised and decided on the quiet title suit brought by Ade-
line Bearss (1881). The suits were both brought to quiet title to the same
strip of land and the plaintiffs in both suits relied upon the same instrument
as the source of their title.
The only possible difficulty is in determining whether or not the privity
in parties is sufficient to satisfy the doctrine's requirements. It is apparent
that the appellant was not a party to the quiet title suit brought by her
mother since she was unborn at the time. If the judgment rendered therein
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was binding upon her it must be shown that her interests were in good faith
represented in the proceedings. The interests of the present appellant and
of George A. Evans were identical. Both were members of a class to whom
an individual remainder in fee simple was given. In accordance with the
doctrine of "virtual representation," unborn remaindermen may be bound
by a judgment when the remaindermen in esse are made parties. Coquillard
v. Coquillard, 62 Ind. App. 489, 15 R. C. L. 1025.
There are two principles advanced as the basis for such a rule. It is at
once apparent that if the remaindermen have identical interests the same
issues will be raised by the one as the other and if it is impossible for both
to be made parties to an action one of the remaindermen can be depended
upon to bring forward the entire merits of the controversy as a protection
to his own interests. The other reason advanced as making the application
of the doctrine desirable is one of necessity and expediency. Cases arise in
which, if it be held necessary to bring before the court every person having
a present or future interest in the property, the suit could never be brought
to a conclusion or at least a resulting inequitable delay would prevent the
adjustment of present rights because of the contingency of an interested
party, not yet in being. Kent v. Church of St. Michael, 18 L. R. A. 331.
The courts in Indiana have previously decided the immediate point under
consideration (Coquillard v. Coquillard, supra) and a review of the other
authorities supports the Appellate Court in its decision. Wayne v. Bunnley,
227 S. W. 996; Doroney v. Sub, 185 N. Y. 427; and note 8 L. R. A. (n. s.)
49; Mathew v. Lightner, 85 Minn. 333.
The doctrine of "virtual representation" will not be applied when fraud
or collusion is alleged and proved but in this case there was no such alle-
gation so that for the purpose of appeal, the absence of fraud is admitted
and need not be considered as an issue in the case.
It appears from the discussion that the appellant was attempting a suit
upon the same issues and between the same parties (or those in privety
therewith) as that already decided in a former proceeding wherein the ap-
pellant was represented and bound by the judgment. Such an action in-
volves the doctrine of res judicata and was correctly decided below on that
basis. The decision of the Supreme Court, however, perpetuates the error
of Fletcher v. Fletcher. H. W. S.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-INJURY ARISING OUT OF AND IN TEE COURSE
OF EMPLOYMENT-AccIDENT-One, Brewer worked for twelve to fourteen
years on the same job in a brick factory. There was always a considerable
amount of gas and smoke in the air as was necessitated by the brick kilns.
Brewer on Monday, April 14, 1930, became sick from the gas and smoke,
which were always clearly visible and known to Brewer. But he continued
to work until the following Friday when he became so overcome that he had
to quit work. Brewer claimed compensation under the Workmen's Compen-
sation Act, but it was denied him by the Industrial Board on the ground
that his injury did not arise by "accident." Held, affirmed. Brewer v.
Veedersburg Paving Co., Appellate Court of Indiana, June 25, 1931, 177
N. E. 74.
Raymond Bertels works for seven years handling heated metal sheets
in a steel mill. The place of working was necessarily extremely warm and
